












even  much  earlier—we  had  been  told  “subtract”  (or  “add”  or 
“multiply”).
Now Hebb’s example was not decisive—as no refutation of push/pull 































explain  how  it  works—but  not  necessarily  in  the  physiological  sense. 
Skinner was right about that. Only in the functional, cause–effect sense. 
And  regarding  the  functional  explanation  of  our  behavioral  capacities, 
behaviorism, in its brief against its predecessor, introspectionism had again 






















set  of  symbol-manipulation  rules—and  that  is  already  a  big  step  past 








as  I  do)?  How  I  learn  from  experience?  How  I  reason?  How  I  use  and 
understand words and sentences?













to  the  child;  hence  the  child  must  already  have  the  rules  built  in,  in 
advance.
But  Chomsky’s  lesson  to  Skinner  applies  beyond  syntax.  Vocabulary 












viduals”  are  not  “stimuli,”  but  likewise  kinds,  detected  through  their 
sensorimotor  invariants;  there  are  sensorimotor  “constancies”  to  be 
detected even for a sphere, which almost never casts the identical shadow 
onto our sensory surfaces twice.)






































that  anyone  could  ever  have  failed  to  see  this  answer—that  the  way  I 
remember her name is by picturing her, and then identifying the picture—
as having been anything but empty question-begging. How do I come up 
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of pictures in the head. Let’s say that Zenon could have replied that words 





















that  just  about  anything  was  computable,  and  hence  computationally 
simulable  to  as  close  an  approximation  as  one  liked—Zenon  relegated 
everything that was noncomputational to the “noncognitive.” It occurred 
“below  the  level  of  the  architecture  of  the  virtual  machine”  that  does   
the  cognizing,  implemented  instead  in  “informationally  encapsulated” 
sensorimotor modules that were “cognitively impenetrable”—that is, not 
modifiable by what we know and can state explicitly in propositions and 







of  functional  explanation,  whereas  Skinner  was  avoiding  it.  Moreover, 
both Pylyshyn and Skinner were right in insisting that the details of the 
physical [hardware] implementation of a function were independent of 
the  functional  level  of  explanation  itself—except  that  Skinner  had  no 
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not only do we explain how the minds works (once we figure out what 





































































































studying  the  dynamics  of  the  brain.  I  think  Searle,  too,  went  too  far 
(Harnad 2001). There is still scope for a fully functional explanation of 
cognition, just not a purely computational one. As we have seen, there are 
other  candidate  autonomous,  nonhomuncular  functions  in  addition  to 







they  are  ever-so-systematically  interpretable  as  being  about—connected 
directly and autonomously, without begging the question by having the 

















structures  and  processes  will  be  computational  and  what  proportion 
dynamic. We can just be sure that they cannot all be computational, all 






















are  connected  to  their  referents,  possibly  along  the  lines  of  Pylyshyn’s  [1994]   
indexes or FINSTs) would still be computation at all: After all, the hallmark of clas-
sical computation (and of language itself) is that symbols are arbitrary, and that 
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